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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
GREGORY MAURICE WARD, : Case No. 20080478-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Appellant is incarcerated. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is a consolidated appeal from two judgments of conviction. See Addendum 
A. In case no. 071908607, Gregory Ward was convicted of one count of ThcfL, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (2003), the Honorable Deno G. 
Ilimonas, presiding. See Addendum B. In case no. 081900984, Ward was convicted of 
one count of Theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
(2003), the Flonorable Deno G. Himonas, presiding. See Addendum C.1 Jurisdiction is 
conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (Supp. 2008). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it decided not to give 
1
 Hereinafter, case no. 071908607 will be referenced as case no. 8607 and case no. 
081900984 will be referenced as case no. 0984. Citations to the record for these cases 
will be to R. 8607 and R. 0984 respectively, followed by the record page in parentheses. 
The transcripts will be cited as R. 41 (Sentencing Hearing) and R. 45 (Change of Plea 
Hearing), without reference to either case number. Likewise, the presentence report will 
Ward the benefit of the doubt by following its inclination to place him on probation and 
instead sentenced him to prison. 
Standard of Review; This Court reviews sentences for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). '"An abuse of discretion 
may be manifest if the actions of the judge in sentencing were "inherently unfair" or if the 
judge imposed a "clearly excessive" sentence.'" State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 
1991) (citations omitted). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved below at R. 41 (sentencing hearing). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201 (2008), 76-3-203 (2008), 77-18-1 (2008), 77-18-4 
(2008) are determinative of this appeal. Their text is provided in full in Addendum D. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is a consolidation of the two cases. First, in case no. 8607, Mr. Ward 
was charged with one count of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003). R 8607 (1-2). Following a preliminary hearing, Mr. 
Ward was bound over as charged. R. 8607 (15-16). 
Second, in case no. 0984, Mr. Ward was charged with one count of Theft, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (2003) or, in the alternative, 
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
be cited as R. 33. 
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(2003); and two counts of Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (2003). R. 0984 (1-3). Following a preliminary hearing, the trial 
court bound Mr. Ward over on one count of Aggravated Robbery and two counts of 
Aggravated Assault. R. 0984 (16-17). 
On March 14, 2008, the trial court held a change of plea hearing for both cases. R. 
8607 (31 -32); 0984 (27-28); 45; sec Addendum E. Mr. Ward pleaded guilty to two 
counts of theft, a second degree felony. R. 8607 (23-30; 31-32); 0984 (19-26, 27-28); 
45:3. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss all other charges in both cases and to 
recommend that the sentences run concurrently. R. 8607 (27); 0984 (23); 45:3. 
\ presentence report (PSR) was prepared in this case. R. 33. On May 2, 2008, 
Mr. Ward was sentenced in both cases. R. 8607 (34-35); 0984 (29-30); 41; see 
Addendum F. In case no. 8607, the trial court ordered Mr. Ward to serve "an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than Fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison " R. 8607 (34); 41:7. In case no. 0984, the trial court ordered Mr. Ward to serve 
uan indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than Fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison." R. 0984 (29); 41:7. The trial court ordered both sentences to run 
concurrently and granted Mr. Ward credit for time served. R. 8607 (35); 0984 (30); 41:7. 
Mr. Ward Filed a timely notice of appeal in both cases. R. 8607 (36); 0984 (31). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The information in case no. 8607, alleged that on November 15, 2007, Mr. Ward 
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stole CDs, two jackets, and three bottles of beer from a Wal-Mart store. R. 8607 (2). 
When confronted by two store employees, Mr, Ward said, '"I am going to shoot you, so 
back off me!'" R. 8607 (2), lie then "pulled out a silver folding knife" and told the 
employees that "he was going to kill them." R. 8607 (2). The information in case no. 
0984, alleged that on January 14, 2008, Mr. Ward stole CDs and other merchandise from 
a Smith's Food and Drug Store and, when confronted by two store employees, ordered 
them to "'Back off!'" and said, "'I have a knife.'" R. 0984 (2). 
When he pleaded guilty, Mr. Ward admitted that "|o]n November 15th 2007 and 
January 11 |4lh 2008 in Salt Lake County," he "took property of a store without permission 
and with the intent to [permanently] deprive when he possessed a dangerous instrument, 
on one occasion a knife and on the [other] occasion a box cutter." R. 45:7; see also R. 
8607(24); 0984(20). 
The PSR recommended that Mr. Ward "be committed to the Utah State Prison for 
the term prescribed by law." R. 33:2. It determined that Mr. Ward was moderately likely 
to reoffend and "identified problem areas with substance abuse, criminal history, and 
employment/financial." R. 33:2. It stated that Mr. Ward had been incarcerated since 
January 14,2008. R. 33:4. 
Regarding case no. 0984, the PSR said that Mr. Ward stole a pair of shoes, a pair 
of weight lifting gloves, CDs, and four cans of beer from a Smith's Food and Drug Store. 
R. 33:3. When store employees confronted him, Mr. Ward "tried to fight them off and 
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then "reached into the pocket of his coat and said: T have a knife, let me go/ He was 
able to be secured without incident." R. 33:3. 
Regarding case no. 8607, the PSR said that Mr, Ward stole CDs and three bottles 
of beer from a Wal-Mart store. R. 33:3. When confronted by store employees, he 
"threatened to shoot them with a gun and then proceeded to pull a knife on them." R. 
33:3. Mr. Ward then left the store and was arrested later. R. 33:3. 
The PSR showed that Mr. Ward has no juvenile record, but has an adult criminal 
record. R. 33:4-6. His adult record consists mainly of misdemeanor offenses, including 
possession of controlled substances, retail thefts, obstructing justice, shoplifting, one 
simple assault, and one possession of a dangerous weapon. R. 33:5-6. In addition to the 
present offenses, it also contains one third degree felony narcotics conviction from 1996. 
R. 33:5. Based on this felony conviction, Mr. Ward was placed on probation in February 
1997. R. 33:7. "He was then submitted to the Diagnostic Unit at the Utah State Prison in 
July of 1997 and then committed to the Utah State Prison in September of 1997." R, 
33:7. Thereafter, he was granted parole in February 1998. R. 33:2, 7. He violated parole 
four times between March 1998 and June 2000. R. 33:2, 7. lie was discharged in July 
2000 "after being incarcerated on his last parole violation." R. 33:2, 7. 
In his statement for the PSR, Mr. Ward said, "Yes it was wrong for me to go in any 
store and take things. I'm very sorry for the things I've did. It will not happen again." R. 
33:4. 
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On May 2, 2008, Mr. Ward was sentenced in both cases. R. 8607 (34-35); 0984 
(29-30); 41. Mr. Ward asked the trial court to correct the PSR because he did not steal 
four cans of beer. R. 41:2. The trial court granted Mr. Ward's request. R. 41:2. Next, 
Mr. Ward asked the trial court to grant him credit for the "substantial amount of time" 
that he had already served and to put him on probation. R. 41:2-3. The thefts were "very 
small" and "no one was injured." R. 41:2-3. He was "just a desperate individual, and he 
was living on the streets." R. 41:3. Rather than prison, Mr. Ward would benefit from 
"some counseling both for mental health and for drugs." R. 41:3. 
Taking into account Mr. Ward's record, the trial court agreed that the 
recommendation was "a little concerning]," R. 41:3. "I've seen a lot worse. I mean, I 
think we only have the one felony conviction, right?" R. 41:3. He has convictions for 
"retail theft, shoplifting, retail theft, a B simple assault, retail theft," and one third degree 
felony from 1996 "for narcotics." R. 41:4. "|T]his seems to me to be right on the 
borderline." R. 41:4. Ultimately, an unidentified attorney clarified that Mr. Ward was 
placed on probation for the 1996 felony conviction and sent to prison after he violated a 
probationary term. R. 41:5. The State also asked the trial court to refuse probation 
because Mr. Ward possessed a knife during both offenses and pulled the knife out during 
one of the offenses. R. 41:5-6. 
Speaking on his own behalf, Mr. Ward said: 
Your Honor, I've made some bad choices in my life. I'm 41 years 
old, and I've come to the conclusion that I can't spend the rest of my 
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life like this. I have kids that would need me, and I just need . . . a 
chance to prove that I can be successful and on the streets and taking 
care of my business. That's all I need is one chance, and I promise 
you, you won't sec me in this Court again. 
R. 41:7. 
Taking the arguments into account, the trial court denied Mr. Ward's request to be 
put on probation and sentenced him to serve two concurrent prison terms of one-to-fifteen 
years each. R. 8607 (34-35); 0984 (29-30); 41:7. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Ward argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request 
to be put on probation and instead sentenced him to serve two concurrent prison terms of 
onc-to-fifteen years each. At sentencing, the trial court expressed reservations about 
sending Mr. Ward to prison. Given that the trial court doubted whether prison was 
appropriate for Mr. Ward and that Mr. Ward has only been on probation once before and 
that was twelve years ago, Mr. Ward believes that the trial court abused its discretion by 
sending him to prison rather than giving him the benefit of the doubt and placing him on 
probation. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING MR. 
WARD'S REQUEST TO BE PLACED ON PROBATION AND INSTEAD 
SENTENCING HIM TO SERVE TWO CONCURRENT PRISON TERMS 
OF ONE-TO FIFTEEN YEARS EACH. 
"Probation is not a matter of right, and this is so no matter how unsullied a 
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reputation one convicted of crime may be able to demonstrate to the trial judge." State v. 
Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1957). "The granting or withholding of probation 
involves considering intangibles of character, personality and attitude, of which the cold 
record gives little inkling." Id "These matters, which arc to be considered in connection 
with the prior record of the accused, are of such nature that the problem of probation must 
of necessity rest within the discretion of the judge who hears the case." Id. "This is not 
to say that if it were clearly shown that the trial judge would have granted probation 
except for some wholly irrelevant, improper or inconsequential consideration, such 
refusal might be so capricious and arbitrary as to warrant the conclusion that he did not in 
fact exercise his discretion and justify a review of his action." Id.; see State v. Rhodes, 
818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("Because so many different ingredients factor 
into the sentencing process, and because the discretionary imposition of probation rests in 
many cases upon subtleties not apparent on the face of a cold record, before the review 
court may overturn the sentence . . . 'it must be clear that the actions of the judge were so 
inherently unfair as to constitute abuse of discretion/" (citation omitted)). 
A trial court's "|a]busc of discretion may be manifest if the actions of the judge in 
sentencing were 'inherently unfair' or if the judge imposed a 'clearly excessive 
sentence.'" State v. Schweitzer, 943 P,2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations and 
additional quotations omitted). A trial court abuses its discretion when it '"fails to 
consider all legally relevant |sentencing] factors/" State v. McCovcy, 803 P.2d 1234, 
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1235 (Utah 1990) (quoting State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989)), or when 
the trial judge fails to give '"adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances/" State 
v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, «fl5, 40 P.3d 626 (quoting State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 
1998)). This Court will find a trial court has abused its discretion when it concludes that 
'"no reasonable (person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.'" Schweitzer, 
943 P.2d at 651 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
For example, in State v. Hopkins, 2006 UT App 498, 2006 WL 3648344, the 
defendant "appeal[ed] her sentence, arguing that the trial court should have imposed 
probation instead of [concurrent) prison terms." Hopkins, 2006 UT App 498, at * 1; sec 
Addendum G. This Court affirmed, explaining that the trial court "accepted Defendant's 
corrections to the [PSR]," "acknowledged that Defendant had no prior felony convictions 
and that the corrected report would recommend only intermediate sanctions," and 
"allowed Defendant to make a statement" and "to present mitigating information." l_d. 
The trial court then "balanced the relevant factors presented by Defendant with the 
objectives of deterrence and punishment," "determined that a grant of probation was not 
appropriate given the gravity of the crimes," and "sentenced Defendant to two concurrent 
terms of five years to life." Id 
In this case, Mr. Ward argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not 
suspending the sentence and putting him on probation. At the Change of Plea hearing, 
Mr. Ward admitted that "|o]n November 15th 2007 and January 4th 2008," he "took 
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property of a store without permission and with the intent to personally deprive when he 
possessed a dangerous instrument, on one occasion a knife and on the [other] occasion a 
box cutter." R. 8607(24); 0984(20); 45:7. He then accepted responsibility for his actions 
and pleaded guilty to two counts of theft, a second degree felony. R. 45:3; see R. 
8607(23-30; 31-32); 0984(19-26). 
Mr. Ward has no juvenile criminal history. R. 33:4. He has an adult criminal 
history, but it is composed mostly of misdemeanor offenses. R. 33:5-6. Other than the 
current offenses, Mr. Ward's only felony conviction was a third degree felony involving 
narcotics in 1996. R. 33:5-6. Mr. Ward was placed on probation for that felony 
conviction, but, following a probation violation, he was ''submitted to the Diagnostic Unit 
at the Utah State Prison . . . and then committed to the Utah State Prison." R. 33:7. He 
also violated parole four times over a two-year period before he was discharged in July 
2000. R. 33:2, 7. 
Mr. Ward acknowledges that he has a criminal history, including the 1996 third 
degree felony conviction, but he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by 
denying his request for probation. Mr. Ward's criminal history does not appear to be the 
history of a hardened criminal. Rather, it appears to be the history of a man struggling 
with mental health problems and drug addiction. It was appropriate for the trial court to 
consider "'deterrence and punishment" when imposing sentence. Hopkins, 2006 UT App 
498, at * 1. Mr. Ward, however, believes that the trial court erred by allowing these 
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factors to outweigh other more important considerations. Mr, Ward has only had one 
previous opportunity for probation. He was unsuccessful on probation but that was nearly 
twelve years ago. R. 33:7. Given the length of time that has passed since his last attempt, 
Mr. Ward believes that the trial court should have given him another opportunity in this 
case. On probation, he believes that he could have finally gotten the treatment that he 
needs and could have overcome his problems with mental health and drug addiction, 
Mr. Ward argues that it is evident from the record that the trial court was 
"concerned about the recommendation" for incarceration. R. 41:3. The trial court felt 
that Mr. Ward's case was "right on the borderline." R. 41:4. And it worried that Mr. 
Ward had not received the treatment that he needed when convicted of the 1996 third-
degree felony. R. 41:4. Ultimately, the trial court denied probation and imposed the 
prison sentence because it learned that Mr. Ward violated his probation in 1997 and 
pulled a knife out during one of the current offenses. R. 41:5-7. Where the trial court 
doubted whether prison was appropriate for Mr. Ward, however, Mr. Ward believes that 
the trial court abused its discretion by sending him to prison rather than giving him the 
benefit of the doubt. 
Accordingly, Mr. Ward asks this Court to reverse and remand for resentencing 
because he believes that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request to be 
placed on probation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ward asks this Court to reverse and remand for resentencing because he 
believes that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request to be placed on 
probation. 
SUBMITTED this _ > £ _ day ofJanuary, 2009. 
0-U~ 
LOW J. SRPPI 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, LORI J. SEPPI, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered eight copies of 
the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Ileber M. Wells Building, 
160 East 300 South, 6lh Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this 
^ 0 ^ day of January, 2009. 
LORI J. SEPPI 
DELIVERED this ? n day of January, 2009. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Gregory Maurice Ward, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 20080478-CA 
Case No. 20080479-CA 
This matter is before the court upon Appellant's motion. 
It appears that judicial economy will result by consolidating 
the appeals for a single determination. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that the above appeals are consolidated as Case No. 20080478-CA. 
All future filings shall be filed under Case No. 20080478-CA. 
Dated this /^ yfr^ day of September, 2008. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on September 15, 2008, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail or placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to: 
LORI J. SEPPI 
SCOTT A WILSON 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 E 500 S STE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 8 4111 
J FREDERIC VOROS JR 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
ATTN: MARINA DAVIS & KIT SPENCER 
4 50 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 18 60 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
Dated this September 15, 2008. 
By 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No. 20080478 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 081900984 
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JUN-02-2008 MON 08:26 All J DISTRICT COURT FAX NO. f ^387404 P. 04 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GREGORY MAURICE WARD, 
Defendant, 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 071908607 FS 
Judge : 
Da te : 
DENO HIMONAS 
May 2, 2008 
PRESENT 
Clerk: wendypg 
Prosecutor: BLAYLOCK, ROGER S 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s); WILSON, SCOTT A 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: March 6, 1967 
Video 
Tape Count; 10:13 
CHARGES 
1. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 03/14/2008 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Page 1 
JUN-02-2008 MON 08:26 AM J DISTRICT COURT FAX NO. r ?387404 P. 05 
Case NO: 071908607 
Date: May 02, 2008 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Court orders this case run CONCURRENT with case #081900984. Credit 
for Time Served. 
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE 
ROBERT WOODS 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $350.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: LDA 
The amount of Attorney Fees is to be determined by Board of 
Pardons. 
Dated this ^ day of t-frfr/fm/ 20 <3£-. 
Page 2 (last) 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GREGORY MAURICE WARD, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 081900984 FS 
Judge; 
Date: 
DENO HIMONAS 
May 2, 2008 
PRESENT 
Clerk: wendypg 
Prosecutor; BLAYLOCK, ROGER S 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s); WILSON, SCOTT A 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth; March 6, 1967 
Video 
Tape Count; 10:13 
CHARGES 
1. THEFT - 2nd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 03/14/2008 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 2nd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
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JUN-02-2008 (ION 08:26 AM i DISTRICT COURT FAX NO. f ^  ?387404 P. 03 
Case No: 081900984 
Date: May 02, 2008 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Court orders this case run CONCURRENT with case #071908607, Credit 
for Time Served. 
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE 
ROBERT WOODS 
SENTENCE TRUST NOTE . 
ATTORNEY FEES WERE ASSESSED ON CASE #071908607. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201 (2008) 
§ 76-3-201. Definitions—Sentences or combination of sentences allowed—Civil penalties-
-Hearing 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii)plea of guilty, 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any 
other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing 
court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a 
person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or 
events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equiva-
lent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including 
earnings and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a 
victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transporta-
tion and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(e)(i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities, 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted 
of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(f) to death. 
(3)(a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4)(a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary dam-
ages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defen-
dant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to 
make restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria 
and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(5)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the 
defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant 
was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state at 
governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transporta-
tion expenses if any of the following apply: 
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(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear a 
warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c)(i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i) 
shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each defendant 
transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a single 
trip. 
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradi-
tion, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in the 
county to which he has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it 
may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any go-
vernmental entity for the extradition. 
(6)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless otherwise or-
dered by the court pursuant to Subsection (6)(c), the defendant shall pay restitution to the 
county for the cost of incarceration in the county correctional facility before and after 
sentencing if: 
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in the 
county correctional facility; and 
(ii)(A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional facility 
through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or 
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided under Section 
64-13e-104 if the defendant is a state probationary inmate, as defined in Section 64-
13e-102, or a state parole inmate, as defined in Section 64-13e-102. 
(b)(i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are the amount determined by 
the county correctional facility, but may not exceed the daily inmate incarceration costs 
and medical and transportation costs for the county correctional facility. 
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(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses in-
curred by the county correctional facility in providing reasonable accommodation for 
an inmate qualifying as an individual with a disability as defined and covered by the 
federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, in-
cluding medical and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability. 
(c) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under this Subsection 
(6) be reduced or that the defendant be exempted from the restitution, the court shall 
consider the criteria under Subsections 77-38a-302 (5)(c)(i) through (iv) and shall enter 
the reason for its order on the record. 
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity under Subsec-
tion (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 76-1-304, the county shall 
reimburse the defendant for restitution the defendant paid for costs of incarceration un-
der Subsection (6)(a). 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-201; Laws 1979, c. 69, § 1; Laws 1981, c. 59, § 1; Laws 1983, 
c. 85, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 88, § 3; Laws 1984, c. 18, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 156, § 1; Laws 
1987, c. 107, § l;Laws 1990, c. 81, § 1; Laws 1992, c. 142, § 1; Laws 1993, c. 17, § 1; 
Laws 1994, c. 13, § 19: Laws 1995, c. 111. § 1, eff. May 1. 1995; Laws 1995, c. 117, 
3 l.eff.Mav 1, 1995; Laws 1995. c. 301, § 1. eff. May 1, 1995: Laws 1995, c. 337. $ 
1. eff May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, 1st Sp.Sess., c. 10, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996: Laws 
1996, c. 40. 3 1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 79, 3 98. eff. April 29. 1996; Laws 
1996, c. 241, §§ 2, 3. eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1998, c. 149, § 1. eff. May 4, 1998; 
Laws 1999, c. 270, 3 15, eff. May 3. 1999; Laws 2001, c. 209. § 1, eff. April 30. 2001; 
Laws 2002. c. 35. 3 4, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 280. § 1, eff May 5, 2003: 
Laws 2006, c. 208, $ 1, eff. May 1, 2006; Laws 2007, c. 154, 3 1, eff April 30. 2007; 
Laws 2007. c. 339. § 3, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2007, c. 353. 3 9, eff. April 30, 2007: 
Laws 2008. c. 151. $ 1, eff. May 5. 2008. 
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UTAH CODE ANN, 76-3-203 (2008) 
§ 76-3-203. Felony conviction—Indeterminate term of imprisonment 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, unless the statute provides otherwise, for a 
term of not less than five years and which may be for life. 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, unless the statute provides otherwise, for 
a term of not less than one year nor more than 15 years, 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, unless the statute provides otherwise, for a 
term not to exceed five years. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-203; Laws 1976, c. 9, § 1; Laws 1977, c. 88, § 1; Laws 1983, 
c. 88. § 5: Laws 1995. c. 244. § 2. eff. May 1. 1995: Laws 1997. c. 289. § 2. eff. May 5. 
1997; Laws 2000. c. 214. § 1. eff. March 14. 2000: Laws 2003. c. 148. $ 2. eff. May 5. 
2003. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-1 (2008) 
§ 77-18-1. Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyance—Probation—Supervision— 
Presentence investigation—Standards—Confidentiality—Terms and conditions-
Termination, revocation, modification, or extension—Hearings—Electronic monitoring 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a plea in 
abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77, 
Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2)(a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of any crime 
or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence 
and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cas-
es of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
(b)(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the department is 
with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court 
is vested as ordered by the court. 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3)(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards 
for all individuals referred to the department. These standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level of services 
shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial 
Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for review and com-
ment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to implement the 
supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to 
the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other criteria as they consider 
appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact report and 
submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to supervise 
the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions or to con-
duct presentence investigation reports on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, 
the department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with 
department standards. 
(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the 
defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of 
time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from the department 
or information from other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact statement accord-
ing to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the effect of the crime on the vic-
tim and the victim's family. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary 
damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the pay-
ment of restitution with interest by the defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 
38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(d) The presentence investigation report shall include: 
(i) findings from any screening and any assessment of the offender conducted under 
Section 77-18-1.1; and 
(ii) recommendations for treatment of the offender. 
(e) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any diagnostic evalu-
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ation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, are protected and are not 
available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the 
Judicial Council or for use by the department. 
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the defen-
dant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the 
court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the 
presentence investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the de-
partment prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and 
the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of 
the report with the department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be re-
solved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at 
the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or informa-
tion the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropri-
ate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in open court on 
record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require that the 
defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed on proba-
tion; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support the defendant is legally liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs, including any treatment program in 
which the defendant is currently participating, if the program is acceptable to the 
court; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail designated by the 
department, after considering any recommendation by the court as to which jail the 
court finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of electronic moni-
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toring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the compen-
satory service program provided in Section 76-6-107.1; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in accordance 
with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a 
GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's own expense if the de-
fendant has not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior 
to being placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed in Subsec-
tion (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as defined by Sec-
tion 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 dur-
ing: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with Subsection 77-
27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised probation and 
any extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection (10). 
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon 
completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor 
cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions. 
(ii)(A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection 
(10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as defined in 
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Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the de-
fendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the 
account receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the registry of civil 
judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and immediately transfer re-
sponsibility to collect the account to the Office of State Debt Collection. 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or upon 
its own motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why the defen-
dant's failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court. 
(b)(i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State Debt Collec-
tion, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of 
supervised probation will occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of 
details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(1 l)(a)(i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been 
charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation docs not 
constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exone-
rated at a hearing to revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revoca-
tion of probation docs not constitute service of time toward the total probation term 
unless the probationer is exonerated at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation report 
with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the 
issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the court. 
(12)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by 
the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has violated 
the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that 
the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to consti-
tute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized probation shall 
determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modifi-
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cation, or extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the 
defendant a warrant for the defendant's arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to 
show cause why the defendant's probation should not be revoked, modified, or ex-
tended. 
(c)(i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and shall be 
served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing, 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented by 
counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if the defendant is indi-
gent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present evidence. 
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney 
shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations arc 
based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless 
the court for good cause otherwise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in the defendant's own be-
half, and present evidence. 
(c)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court 
may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation 
term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previous-
ly imposed shall be executed. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of the Division 
of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a con-
dition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the Utah State 
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Hospital or the superintendent's designee has certified to the court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for treat-
ment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
(34) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic evaluations, are 
classified protected in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 2, Government Records 
Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63G-2-403 and 63G-2-404, the 
State Records Committee may not order the disclosure of a presentence investigation re-
port. Except for disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the depart-
ment may disclose the presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63G-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the department 
for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the subject's au-
thorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence investigation re-
port or the victim's authorized representative, provided that the disclosure to the victim 
shall include only information relating to statements or materials provided by the vic-
tim, to the circumstances of the crime including statements by the defendant, or to the 
impact of the crime on the victim or the victim's household. 
(15)(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation under the 
supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406,5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home confinement, in-
cluding electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to the department in accor-
dance with Subsection (16). 
(16)(a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may order the 
defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring as 
described in this section until further order of the court. 
7 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law en-
forcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the defendant's com-
pliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through electronic 
monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department of Cor-
rections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the defendant 
and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to the de-
partment or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electronic moni-
toring only for those persons who have been determined to be indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this section ei-
ther directly or by contract with a private provider. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1981, c. 59, § 2; Laws 1982, c. 9, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 47, § 1; 
Laws 1983, c. 68, § l;Laws 1983, c. 85, § 2; Laws 1984, c. 20, § l;Laws 1985, c. 212, § 
17; Laws 1985, c. 229, § l;Laws 1987, c. 114, § l;Laws 1989, c. 226, § l;Laws 1990. 
c. 134, $2; Laws 1991, c. 66, § 5; Laws 1991, c. 206, $6; Laws 1992, c. 14, § 3; 
Laws 1993. c. 82, §7; Laws 1993, c. 220, § 3: Laws 1994, c. 13. § 24; Laws 1994. c. 
198, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 230, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 20, § 146, effi May 1, 1995; Laws 
1995, c. 117, §2. eff. May 1, 1995: Laws 1995, c. 184, § 1. eff. May 1. 1995: Laws 
1995, c. 301. S3, eff May 1, 1995: Laws 1995, c. 337. $ 11, eff. May L 1995: Laws 
1995, c. 352, § 6, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 79, § 103. eff April 29. 1996; Laws 
1997. c. 390. $ 2, eff. May 5, 1997: Laws 1998, c. 94, § 10, eff. May 4, 1998: Laws 
1999, c. 279, $ 8, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 1999, c. 287, § 7, eff. May 3. 1999; Laws 
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2001, c. 137, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 7, eff. May 6. 2002; Laws 
2002, 5th Sp.Sess., c. 8. § 137, eff. Sept. 8, 2002; Laws 2003. c. 290, $ 3. eff May 5, 
2003; Laws 2005, 1st Sp.Sess., c. 14, § 3, eff July 1, 2005; Laws 2007, c. 218, $ 3. eff. 
July 1,2007; Laws 2008, c. 3, $ 252, eff Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2193. eff. 
May 5, 2008. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-4 (2008) 
§ 77-18-4. Sentence—Term—Construction 
(1) Whenever a person is convicted of a crime and the judgment provides for a commit-
ment to the state prison, the court shall not fix a definite term of imprisonment unless 
otherwise provided by law. 
(2) The sentence and judgment of imprisonment shall be for an indeterminate term of not 
less than the minimum and not to exceed the maximum term provided by law for the par-
ticular crime. 
(3) Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, every sentence, regardless of its form 
or terms, which purports to be for a shorter or different period of time, shall be construed 
to be a sentence for the term between the minimum and maximum periods of time pro-
vided by law and shall continue until the maximum period has been reached unless soon-
er terminated or commuted by authority of the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1994, c. 13, §26. 
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March 14th 2008; 10:34 a.m. 
PROCEEDINGS 
THE COURT: This is the case of the State of Utah 
versus Greg Ward. It's Case No. 081900984. 
Will you enter your appearances, please? 
MR. WILSON: Scott Wilson for the Defendant Gregory 
Ward. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Roger Blaylock for the State. Your 
Honor, there should be two cases. 
THE COURT: There are two cases. What's proposed? 
MR. WILSON: Your Honor, on each one of the 
informations the Defendant is going to plead to one count of 
theft, a felony second and all the other charges are to be 
dismissed. 
THE COURT: Well, on the single count of aggravated 
robbery is going to be just — 
MR. WILSON: A theft. 
THE COURT: Wouldn't it be aggravated? 
MR. WILSON: No, just theft. 
THE COURT: Do you have amended informations? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: No. We just arrived at this agreement 
today. It would be 76-6-404 in the Defendant's property from 
another and at the time had a weapon. 
MR. WILSON: A dangerous instrument. 
Your Honor, it is in the other indictment — the 
1 other information, I should say. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 MR. WILSON: Because he's charged with the 
4 alternative in that information. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. 
6 MR. BLAYLOCK: Okay. 
7 THE COURT: I'm assuming there is no objection to 
8 amendment by interlineation? 
9 MR. BLAYLOCK: No, Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Sir, have you read the Statement of the 
11 Defendant? 
12 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
13 THE COURT: Did you understand it? 
14 MR. WILSON: I read it to him, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Did you read it word for word? 
16 MR. WILSON: I did. 
17 THE COURT: Did you understand it? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
19 THE COURT: Do you read, speak, write, and understand 
20 I the English language? 
21 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
22 THE COURT: What is the highest level of education 
23 I you've had? 
24 I THE DEFENDANT: Tenth grade. 
25 I THE COURT: Any questions about that document? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Are you thinking clearly today? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the advice that 
you have received from Mr. Wilson? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Want anymore time to think about these 
pleas? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Do you suffer from any type of a 
condition, physical, mental, emotional, for which you are 
receiving treatment? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Have you been prescribed any medications 
that you are not current taking? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Have you gone through the Statement of 
the Defendant? Do you understand you are giving up a number of 
extremely important rights by entering this plea? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: You are giving up your right to a speedy 
public trial, is that clear? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: You are giving up your right to have an 
iitpartial jury of your peers convene to hear and decide the 
case; is that clear? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: You are giving up your right to put on a 
defense, including compelling the attendance of witnesses to 
came and testify on your behalf at no cost to you; is that 
clear? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: You are giving up the right to sit in 
open court with Mr. Wilson to confront and cross-examine the 
State's witnesses and to test the State's evidence; is that 
clear? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: You are giving up the presumption of 
innocence, the right to require the State to prove each and 
every element to the charges against you with proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt; is that clear? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: If you did proceed to trial and if you 
were convicted by a unanimous jury you would have substantial 
appeal rights, that is the ability to go to another court and 
ask that court to review the record here to determine if any 
mistakes were made. By in large, not entirely, but by in 
large, you do give up those rights? Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: You been charged by amended information 
6 
with two charges of theft as a second degree felony. A second 
degree felony in this state is punishable potentially with 
incarceration in the county jail for a period of — excuse me, 
the state prison for a period 1 to 15 years, a fine of up to 
$10,000 and an eighty-five percent surcharge, do you understand 
that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you further understand that these 
sentences may be caused — may be stacked one on top of the 
other and or caused to run consecutively so that as a result of 
your pleas today you are facing possibly a minium of two and a 
maximum of 30 years in prison, if they were cause to run 
consecutive, a fine of up $20,000, plus a eighty-five percent 
surcharge? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: And the factual basis. 
MR. ELAXLOCK: On November 15th 2007 and January 4th 
2008 in Salt Lake County, the Defendant took property of a 
store without permission and with the intent to personally 
deprive when he possessed a dangerous instrument, on one 
occasion a knife and on the occasion a box cutter. 
THE COURT: Is that what happened? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because you are 
guilty? 
7 
1 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ward, with respect to the 
3 charge in the case ending 984, theft, a second degree felony, 
4 how do you plead? 
5 THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. I 
6 THE COURT: With respect to the charge in case ending 
7 607, a theft, a second degree felony, how do you plead? 
8 THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
9 THE COURT: I accept both of your pleas. I find them 
10 knowingly, freely, intelligently, volimtarily made. I ask that 
11 you sign the Statement of the Defendant. I will sign it upon 
12 presentment and incorporate it into the record by reference. 
13 You have the right, sir, to be sentenced in not fewer 
14 than two and in not more than 45 days. You also have the right 
15 to ask that your plea be set aside at any time prior to 
16 sentencing. 
17 Do you understand these rights? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
19 THE COURT: I ask if you would be willing to waive 
20 the maximum time for sentencing today so I may obtain a 
21 presentence report? 
22 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
23 I THE COURT: Let's have AP&P prepare a presentence 
24 I report in connection with this matter — or these matters. Set 
25 I sentencing for — 
THE CLERK: May 2nd. 
THE COURT: May 2nd at 9:00 a m. 
Good luck, Mr. Ward. 
THE DEFENDANT: Thank you. 
MR. WILSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(End of Proceedings.) 
TabF 
0&>^ G^DQO^Oo 
-1-
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ORIGINAL 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs . Case No, 081900984 FS 
GREGORY MAURICE WARD, 
Defendant. 
Sentencing Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
May 2, 2008 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE DENO HIMONAS 
Third District Court Judge 
APPEARANCES 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 1 0 2008 
JAA SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputjf 
For t h e S t a t e : 
For t h e De fendan t : 
Roger S. B l a v l o c k 
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
111 E a s t Broadway 
S u i t e 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
Scott A. Wilson 
LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 West 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (8 01)532-54 4 4 
Clerk 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, CSR/CCT 
1909 South Washington Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 377-2927 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE flOURTS 
JUL 2 8 2008 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
- 2 -
P R O C E E D I N G S 
( E l e c t r o n i c a l l y r e c o r d e d on May 2, 20O8) 
THE COURT: C o u r t would c a l l t h e c a s e s of Gregory Ward. 
We've g o t q u i t e t h e c a l e n d a r t o d a y . 
MR. WILSON: Gregory Ward. 
COURT BAILIFF: Grego ry Ward? 
MR. WILSON: Yes . 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. WILSON: Your Honor, this is on for sentencing. We 
have gone over the pre-sentence investigation report. We don't 
find any factual corrections, except he points out that on page 
3 of the report it says that he took four cans of Budweiser and 
concealed them. Well, he brought those in the store with him. 
He doesn't deny shoplifting other than that. So other than 
that the pre-sentence investigation report is factually 
correct. 
THE COURT: Well, what did he shoplift, then, if it 
wasn't the four cans? 
MR. WARD: CD' s and — 
MR. WILSON: CD's, your Honor, and some other things in 
the store. 
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1 bad, he's running, he's trying to get away — 
2 THE COURT: Does it matter if they're small, if he's 
3 got a knife, if he's only taking a little bit with the knife? 
4 MR. WILSON: Yes, it does, yes, because of the 
5 seriousness of it, because I don't -- he didn't -- he didn't 
6 cut anybody, no one was injured. You know, he's just a 
7 desperate individual, and he was living on the streets. 
8 I just think the recommendation is too much for the 
9 crime. That he obviously needs — feels that he needs some 
10 counseling both for mental health and for drugs. He's been 
11 in a substantial amount of time, so that we would ask the Court 
12 to place him on probation with counseling for mental health and 
13 drugs. He suggested the Odyssey House. 
14 THE COURT: Mr. Blaylock, I'm not — I'm a little 
15 concerned about the recommendation here, 
16 MR. BLAYLOCK: Your Honor, I think it results from his 
17 record. 
18 THE COURT: Yeah. 
19 MR. BLAYLOCK: It involves -
20 THE COURT: I see that, but I've seen a lot worse. I 
21 mean, I think we only have the one felony conviction, right? 
22 MR. BLAYLOCK: Well, there's an aggravated assault back 
23 in x07, which is just a year ago. Then we have a robbery that 
24 we don't have any Information on. 
25 I THE COURT: I don't have an agg assault. 
-4-
1 MR. BLAYLOCK: Then a bunch of other retail thefts. 
2 THE COURT: I have a simple assault. The agg assault 
3 was dismissed. 
4 MR. BLAYLOCK: That's correct. I'm just saying that — 
5 THE COURT: I've got retail theft, shoplifting, retail 
6 theft, a B simple assault, retail theft, possession and — I've 
7 got the one-third for narcotics that they put him in prison 
8 for. You know, I don't know about that. I mean, it's - - this 
9 seems to me to be right on the borderline. I'm not opposed to 
10 making it zero tolerance and giving him a shot, but I don't — 
11 MR. BLAYLOCK: Well, I think the concern was that he 
12 has been involved in a number of incidents that appear to be — 
13 THE COURT: You know what bugs me about this one? Is 
14 I'm a little concerned about that original prison commitment, 
15 to start with, on a first third for a drug charge with a couple 
16 of retail thefts, and we put him in prison right away, with no 
17 treatment. Then since we put him in prison once before, just 
18 assume that that's where he ought to go each and every time. 
19 MR. BLAYLOCK: Well, I think that may have arisen from 
20 — has he always lived here? That's one thing I haven't looked 
21 at, whether we have addressed some criminal activity in other 
22 jurisdictions. 
23 THE COURT: Well, we're not — I have no idea, but we 
24 have a history — 
25 I MR. WILSON: He says he's lived here for 15 or 20 
-5-
1 years. 
2 THE COURT: I've got a history here from '87 that is — 
3 MR. WILSON: Right. 
4 MR. BLAYLOCK: But you were talking about the initial 
5 conviction that sent him to prison. 
6 THE COURT: Right. I'm going to assume that they had 
7 the same information that I had at the time, 
8 MR. BLAYLOCK: Okay. 
9 THE COURT: You know, prior to that conviction, he had 
10 one possession — 
11 UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: Your Honor, I do show that he 
12 was on probation with the Court. He was on probation I think 
13 (inaudible) violated the (inaudible) diagnostic in July '97 — 
14 THE COURT: Is that right? 
15 UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: — (inaudible) diagnostic he 
16 was sent to prison. 
17 MR. WILSON: And the concern I --
18 THE COURT: All right. Well, that actually makes me 
19 feel a little bit better about the original commitment, then, 
20 rather than — because I couldn't, looking at that history, 
21 otherwise understand why he had earned a prison commitment. 
22 MR. BLAYLOCK: Well, the concern that I have is his 
23 response to being stopped by the store people is to threaten 
24 them with a knife. That's my main concern, is why he feels 
25 that was an appropriate response. 
-6-
1 THE COURT: Well, did he brandish the weapon? 
2 J MR. BLAYLOCK: I think it was more a statement. 
3 MR. WILSON: He says, "I have a knife. Let me go." 
4 MR. BLAYLOCK: Yeah, the other occasion that was filed 
5 as an agg robbery, he made the statement that he had a gun and 
6 was going to shoot somebody. 
7 THE COURT: But he didn't have a gun. 
8 MR. BLAYLOCK: No. 
9 THE COURT: But he had a knife again. 
10 MR. BLAYLOCK: Yeah, but he had — 
11 THE COURT: But he didn't brandish the weapon in either 
12 case. 
13 UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: It said — it shows that he did 
14 brandish the knife. 
15 THE COURT: In which case? 
16 UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEY: On the Wal-Mart case, on the 
17 '07 case, 
18 MR. WILSON: It says — my reading of it is that — 
19 MR. BLAYLOCK: I'm trying to remember if he had — 
20 MR. WILSON: — is that he reached into the pocket of 
21 his coat and said, "I have a knife. Let me go." He was able 
22 to be secured without incident. 
23 THE COURT: No, and proceeded to pull the knife. 
24 MR. WILSON: Well, I guess I'm reading — is that the 
25 I second one on the factual — 
-7-
THE COURT: Yeah, it's the Wal-Mart case. All right. 
This is your chance to talk to me about your potential sentence 
Mr. Ward. 
MR. WARD: Your Honor, I've made some bad choices in my 
life. I'm 41 years old, and I've come to the conclusion that I 
can't spend the rest of my life like this. I have kids that 
would need me, and I just need one — I just need a chance to 
prove that I can be successful and on the streets and taking 
care of my business. That's all I need is one chance, and I 
promise you, you won't see me in this Court again. 
THE COURT: Mr. Wilson, any legal reason of which you 
are aware why I should not proceed to sentence? 
MR. WILSON: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: With respect to the matter ending 8607, a 
charge of theft as a second degree felony, I'm sentencing you 
to the indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years at the State Prison. 
With respect to the charge ending 0984, theft, a second-degree 
felony, I'm sentencing you to the indeterminate term of 1 to 
15 years at the State Prison. They'll run concurrent with one 
another, recommend that you receive credit for any time served. 
You have 30 days in which to appeal. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: No recoupment; is that correct? 
THE COURT: Sorry, $350 for recoupment fee for the 
services of LEGAL (inaudible). 
MR. WILSON: And a pint of blood. Thank you, your 
-8-
1 I Honor. That's all I have at this time. 
2 (Hearing concluded) 
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Before Judges DAVIS, McHUGH, and ORME. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
ORME, Judge: 
*1 We have determined that "[t]he facts and legal 
arguments are adequately presented in the briefs 
and record[,] and the decisional process would not 
be significantly aided by oral argument."Utah 
R.App. P. 29(a)(3). Moreover, the issues presented 
are readily resolved under applicable law. 
Defendant appeals her sentence, arguing that the 
trial court should have imposed probation instead of 
prison terms. "The defendant is not entitled to pro-
bation, but rather the court is empowered to place 
the defendant on probation if it thinks that will best 
serve the ends of justice and is compatible with the 
public interest "State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 
1051 (Utah Ct.App.l991).&e also State v. Sibert, 6 
Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (1957) ("Probation 
is not a matter of right, and this is so no matter how 
unsullied a reputation one convicted of a crime may 
be able to demonstrate to the trial judge."). Defend-
ant nonetheless argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion because it failed to consider all legally 
relevant factors and imposed an excessive sentence. 
Although there were errors in the presentence re-
port, it is clear from the record that the trial court 
accepted Defendant's corrections to the report. The 
trial court acknowledged that Defendant had no pri-
or felony convictions and that the corrected report 
would recommend only intermediate sanctions. The 
court allowed Defendant to make a statement, in 
which she apologized, and allowed her to present 
mitigating information, including that she never 
possessed the gun, that she had made positive pro-
gress during her jail stay, and that she needed to go 
through drug treatment and other counseling. Thus, 
the requirements of rule 22(a) were satisfied. See 
Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a).FN1 
FN1. Defendant points to State v. Galli, 
967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), as authority for 
her claim that the court failed to address 
certain necessary factors in its probation 
determination. Galli, however, simply reit-
erates statutorily prescribed factors to be 
addressed in a determination of consecut-
ive sentences, which Defendant did not re-
ceive. See id. at 938. 
After presentation and consideration of all this in-
formation, the trial court sentenced Defendant to 
two concurrent terms of five years to life, reason-
ing: "I do think considering everything that 
I've-that has been presented and that I've read that 
it's too serious simply for alternative senten-
cing."Thus, the court balanced the relevant factors 
presented by Defendant with the objectives of de-
terrence and punishment, see Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 
1051, and determined that a grant of probation was 
not appropriate given the gravity of the crimes. 
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Defendant does not argue that the sentence other-
wise exceeded that allowed by law, and we do not 
see that the sentence was in any other respect ex-
cessive, illegal, or unfair. Thus, we conclude that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in impos-
ing sentence. 
Affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge and 
CAROLYN B. MCHUGH, Judge. 
Utah App.,2006. 
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